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CASE NOTES
Admiralty - Limitation Proceedings - Cross-libel Against Estates of
Deceased Ofcers Whose Administrators File Claims as Representatives of

Deceaseds' Dependents.--Petitioner's vessel sank with the loss of thirty-seven
crew members, three of whom were officers. It filed a petition in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, under General
Admiralty Rule 54 for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability to meet
claims of survivors and next of kin of decedents. Of the claims filed, three were
by representatives of the next of kin of deceased officers, who were also the
administrators of the deceased officers' estates. Petitioner filed cross-libels
against the estates of the deceased officers for loss of the ship because of their
negligence and asserted a claim for indemnity for amounts it might be forced
to pay. All three representatives excepted to the cross-libels on the grounds
that petitioner's claims abated with the officers' deaths and that no cross-libel
may be filed to claims in limitation proceedings. The district court, acting upon
the latter ground only, sustained the exceptions. Upon appeal, held, one judge
dissenting, reversed. General Admiralty Rule 50 authorizes cross-libels arising
out of the same contract or cause of action for which the original libel was filed.
Moore-McCormack Lines v. McMahon, 235 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1956).
It has long been a world-wide maritime policy that a shipowner does not
risk his entire fortune should disaster, occasioned witholit his privity or knowledge, overtake one of his sailing units.' This policy permitting limitation of
liability2 is currently given effect in the United States by statute3 General
Admiralty Rule 54 provides that, in the absence of a claim or suit having been
initiated against a ship in a particular district, the owner of a ship which may
become subject to such suits or claims may, in any United States district court
he chooses, petition for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability. Such was
the procedure followed in the instant case.
Admiralty rules do not specifically regulate practice as to cross-libels, but
General Admiralty Rule 50 provides for security for costs for a cross-libel filed
upon any counterclaim arising out of the same contract or cause of action for
which the original libel was filed. The instant court unanimously 4 rejected the
proposition that no cross-libels may be filed in a limitation proceeding. The
1. Robinson, Admiralty § 117 (1939). "The maritime systems of the world have long
agreed that the maritime entrepreneur does not put his whole fortune at rislk.
2. 3 Benedict, Admiralty § 474 (6th ed. 1940) defines limitation proceeding as "the system by which owners of vessels are enabled to limit their liability to the value of their interest
in the vessel and freight, plus, in some instances, a forfietary sum ... against all manner of
claims generally save seamen's wage claims occasioned without the shipowner's privity or
knowledge."
3. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1S1-S9 (1928). Practice under the statute is governed by General Admiralty Rules 51-54.
4. Afoore-McCormack Lines v. McMahon, 235 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1956): 1I agree with

my colleagues' interpretation of Admiralty Rule 50 and with their unpre_-ed attitude towards
the survival of the alleged claims by appellant against the estates of the three deceased -hip's
officers."
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court quoted Rule 50, noted that all the claims in the instant case arose out of
the one accident and loss as a single cause, and interpreted the rule as authorizing cross-libels in such instances. As direct authority the court cited The Steel
Inventor5 and In re United States Steel Products Co." Both cases arose out of
the collision between the Steel Inventor and the destroyer Woolsey. Both
vessels were at fault. In the United States Steel Products Co. case, in the
limitation proceedings, cargo lien holders intervened as claimants. The United
States Government was held to be in the position of a private party and crosslibels against it were allowed to be filed by the cargo lien holders. The district
court below in the instant case, seized upon the fact that the money to be
recovered by the Government in the Steel Products case was considered a substitute for the lost Woolsey and thus the res, and attempted to distinguish the
case by stating that the basis of the cross-libel in the case before it was the
relationship of the parties. The instant court saw no basis in reason or the
authorities for such a distinction 7 and it would not appear to be of sufficient
weight to overcome the conclusion that cross-libels may be filed against claim8
ants in a limitation proceeding.
Although the court in the instant case was unanimous in holding that
generally cross-libels may be filed in limitation proceedings, the dissent, however, argued that they were not properly filed against the appellees.9 The basis
for the contention by the dissenting judge that the cross-libels were not properly
filed in the present case was that they were filed against the estates of the three
deceased ship's officers, whereas the appellees in the limitation proceedings did
not claim in that capacity.
The appellees here derive their claims from the Jones Act 10 and the Death on
the High Seas Act.1" It is true that both of the above statutes give legal title
to the actions under them to the personal representatives of the decedents, 1 "
and thus require that those persons asserting the claim be the same persons
against whom claims owed by the estate will be asserted. However, any
recovery had under the foregoing acts inures not to the benefit of the decedent's
estate but exclusively to the benefit of decedent's dependent next of kin, 8 and
5. 43 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1930).
6. 24 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1928).
7. 235 F.2d at 143.
8. Cf. British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 230 F.2d 139, 143-45 (4th Cir. 1956).
Contra, 2 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 2 § 329, which cites both In re United States Steel Products
Co. and The Steel Inventor but apparently does not grasp their significance for it states that
"a damage claimant in a limitation proceeding who files an answer to the petition for limitation cannot be treated as a libellant for the purpose of subjecting him to a cross-libel."
9. 235 F.2d at 149.
10. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1944).
11. 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1944).

12. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
13. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1944) incorporates by reference the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, 45 U.S.CA. § 51 (1954), which gives the action ". . . to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and,
if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon
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if none existed at the time of decedent's death, there could be no recovery
under either act' 4
Granting that the distinction made in the dissenting opinion is a valid one, 15
it should not prevail here. Courts of Admiralty are governed by equitable principles' 6 and to uphold the distinction in the present case would be clearly
inequitable to the appellant.
Of course, appellant can set up the negligence of appellees' decedents as a
defense to appellees' claims or in reduction thereof on the basis of comparative
negligence. 17 But appellant's cross-libels are not merely defensive. The allegations contained therein could be the basis of a large affirmative recovery. However, if the appellant has a cause of affirmative action against the estates of the
three deceased officers, and the court is unanimously of that opinion, 8 and if
a cross-libel against them in the limitation proceeding is prohibited, then
appellant may recover on its cause of action only by impleading appellees in
the present proceeding in their capacity as administrators of the decedents'
estates, or, by bringing a separate suit against the appellees as administrators,
both of which require personal service.' 9
Except where a statute of the United States provides otherwise (and they
do not so provide here), service of all processes of a United States district court
is limited to the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held. 0
Appellees in the instant case have maintained themselves so as not to be subject
to personal service in the district; appellant is thus denied the first enumerated
method of recovery, impleader, and left with only the second, the bringing of
a separate suit in another district. Since the claims and counterclaims of all
parties arise out of the one accident and loss as a single cause, the testimony
must be either identical or greatly overlapping.
To insist upon carrying to its logical conclusion the distinction between the
appellees' capacities as administrators of decedents' estates and as representasuch employee...." The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1944), state- that such

action shall be ". . . for the e.Kcusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child,
or dependent relative... Y
14. Lindgren v. United States, 281 US. 38 (1930).
15. In Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Wells-Dicker Trust Co., 275 U.S. 161 (1927), in a suit
brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act which is incorporated by reference in the
Jones Act, the Supreme Court said at 163: "While the suit thereon must be brought by the
personal representative of the employee, he sues as trustee for the person or persons on whose

behalf the Act authorizes recovery" Cf. Weiner v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y.
346, 83 N.E.2d 673 (1949).
16. The Red Lion, 22 F.2d 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1927).
17. In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 US. 424 (1939), the Supreme Court mid at

431: "Any rule of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be applied in
conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence and in harmony
with it. Under that doctrine contributory negligence, however gross, is not a bar to recovery
but only mitigates damages."

18. See note 4 supra.
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (d), (e), (f). 2 Benedict, op. cit. supra note 2 § 2S0, "The Civil
Rules as to service are substantially the same as the admiralty practice... Y

20. Fed. R. Ci. P. 4(f).
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tives of their surviving next of kin and thereby permit one party to recover
judgment while his opponent, to recover on a valid counterclaim arising out of
the same transaction, is forced to the expense of another complete trial of the
issues, would seem inequitable and contrary to the modern trend in practice
toward avoiding, wherever possible, multiplicity of suits and technical obstructionism.

Anti-Trust - Sherman Act - Group Refusal to Deal.-The rules of defendant's insurance board barred members from doing business with mutual
companies or representing companies that operate direct sales branch offices or
contribute to agents' overhead expenses. The Government brought this action,
charging that the rules effected a boycott, and therefore were per se violative of
the Sherman Act. The district court held, boycotts are not per se illegal
restraints of trade, but require the application of the Rule of Reason. United
States v. InsuranceBd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
Section one of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act provides that every contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign trade is illegal.,
Construction of the words "restraint of trade" led to the Rule of Reason which
limited the statute's prohibition to "unreasonable" restraints.2 Thus, the section
was not directed at restraints reasonably ancillary to the doing of business,8 but
to undue restraints of competition ". . . either from the nature or character of
the contract or act [the so called per se illegalities] or where the surrounding
circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been
entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding
personal interest and developing trade [the application of the Rule of
Reason] .... -4
In the leading case against group boycotts, Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Ass'n v. United States,5 the Supreme Court held the concerted action
among a group of retailers, formed for the purpose of inducing wholesalers from
selling directly to consumers by the circulation of blacklists to member potential
customers, to be unlawful under the Sherman Act. Following the same reasoning the Court has held the following illegal: agreement among film distributors
refusing to deal with an exhibitor, blacklisting him because he would not do
business with all the members of the association; 0 refusal of film distributors
to deal with exhibitors except on a standard form of contract providing among
other things for the arbitration of controversies;1 refusal to license films except
1.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).

2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
3. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
4. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
5. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
6. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
7. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
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for cash to any exhibitor whose name appeared on a credit list issued by the
association.8 In none of the cited cases did the Supreme Court expressly rule
that a boycott is a per se violation of the Sherman Act; but, since in each case
the Court failed to discuss the problem of the reasonableness of the boycott, it
would seem that the inference is properly drawn that the Court regarded them
as such. °
Dicta in later cases indicated permissive scope to group refusals to deal, even
though coercive, if motivated by desire to eliminate fraudulent business practices. 10 However, in FashionOriginators' Guild v. FTC," in which a powerful
combination of dressmakers refused to sell to manufacturers and retailers who
dealt in designs "pirated" from the members, attempting to achieve its purpose
of destroying such competition by means of blacdists, "snoopers," and fines,
the Court held that such an intentional restraint on competition was unlawful
even if style copying were a tort under the law of the state. Again, the Court
did not explicitly state that this coercive boycott was a per se violation, but by
denying the defendant manufacturers leave to show that their conduct was not
unreasonable, the Court implied as much. Recent decisions of the Court have
reiterated this position.' 2 The essential characteristic of the above cited cases
has been an intent to directly affect non-members through coercive means
designed either to produce conformity or extinction.
With the Associated Press v. United States'3 decision, in which the legality of
two defendant news-agency by-laws, prohibiting members from selling or furnishing news to non-members (refusal to deal) and imposing barriers upon the
admission to membership of competing newspapers, was before the Court, the
Court apparently extended its condemnation of concerted refusals to deal. In
the district court, 14 Judge Hand distinguished the case from those previously
cited, due to the lack of intent to coerce and concentrated his attention on the
effect on trade in the light of the Rule of Reason, finding the membership by-law
S. United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 2S2 U.S. 44 (1930).

Sce Duplcx Printing

Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (use of threats by union officials again-t plaintiffs);
Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924) (refusal to !:ll to retailer

at other than retail prices).
9. See Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 302 (1942).

10. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 26S U.S. 588 (1925); United States v.
American Livestock Comm'n Co., 279 U.S. 435 (1929). Cf. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
11.

312 U.S.457 (1941).

12. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 US. 293 (1945) (combination of
producers, wholesalers, and retailers to fix and maintain retail price of alcoholic beverages by
adoption of a single course in making contracts of sale, refusing to deal with those who would
not conform); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(a conspiracy whereby Seagram refused to sell to plaintiff dealer and others unless they
agreed to the maximum resale price fixed by Seagram).

13. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
14.

United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
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to be unreasonable.
The Supreme Court affirmed without modification the
decision of the lower court. But, Mr. Justice Black, giving the opinion for the
majority, shifted the emphasis to the refusal to deal, and stressed the size of
AP, constructing the "design to stifle competition""' (coercion) from the bylaws and effect thereof and hence relied on the cited group boycott cases. The
opinion, without discussing the reasonableness of the action, is open to the
interpretation that any combination of a powerful group refusing to deal,
irrespective of purpose, is per se violative of the Sherman Act, the effect of
injury to the public being conclusively presumed. 17 Apparently influenced by
this decision, the Court took the final step in dictum in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co.'8 and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,10
indicating that all group refusals to deal, regardless of purpose or effect, are
per se illegal.
The Government in the instant case, relying on the cited cases and dictum
(discussed supra), asserted that all boycotts (group refusals to deal) are per
se illegal. Rejecting the Government's contention, the instant court drew a
distinction between group refusals to deal exerting coercion and those that do
not, declaring that in all the authorities cited by the Government the essential
element was the common evil of coercive action against parties outside the group.
Hence the court reasoned that if the dicta of the Court in the Columbia Steel
and Times-Picayune cases are to be regarded as a prophecy of the adoption of
the doctrine of per se illegality in future boycott cases, its application will be
limited to cases where a combination seeks by coercion, intimidation, or threat
to compel outsiders to do or refrain from doing that which the group approves
or condemns and where the purpose or "necessary effect" of the combination is
to unduly restrain or monopolize interstate commerce. Thus, the court maintained that the Rule of Reason must be applied to determine whether the rules
of the Board, here under attack, were illegal.
In light of this reasoning, the court found the defendant's Mutual Rule 20 to
be a group refusal to deal, motivated by legitimate business reasons, exerting
no coercion on outsiders, since the mutual companies' agents remain free to
compete with the defendant, and resulting in no unreasonable restraint of trade,
thus not violative of the Sherman Act.
This conclusion is sound, halting the growth towards the unjustified adoption
15. The by-law concerning not selling to non-members (refusal to deal) was only condemned as a part of the exclusionary program, but standing alone would be reasonable. Id.
at 373-74.
16. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
17. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, though concurring, issued a separate opinion, stressing the
use of the Rule of Reason. Id. at 25. The dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts indicates that a
group boycott may be legal. Id. at 29. For a complete discussion of the case, see Lewin,
The Assdciated Press Decision-An Extension of the Sherman Act, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 247
(1946).
18. 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948).
19. 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).

20. This rule barred defendant members from doing business with mutual Insurance
companies.
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of universal condemnation. 2 1 It emphasizes the fact that coercion is not of the
essence of group refusals to deal and that as to boycotts not coercive in their
formation, the Rule of Reason must be applied to determine the legality. However, the court in its discussion of the Direct Writer Rule s goes further. Here
the court, finding a group refusal to deal exerting coercion, nevertheless thought
it necessary to discuss the reasonableness of the activity and concluded that the
rule imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade. This leads to the interpretation
that no boycott is per se illegal. The inference of the group boycott cases that
a group action of coercion is per se illegal is not applicable, the court apparently
feeling that the doctrine of per se illegality as to boycotts, even though coercive,
is a thing of the future but certainly not of the present. Such a position, while
reaching the same result, places the unnecessary burden on the court to evaluate
the significance of the restraint (coercive or not) in the context of the particular
industry against the standard of the Rule of Reason. This is contrary to prevailing opinion on the subject.P

Arrest - Traffic Infraction - Failure to State Cause of Arrest.-Plaintiff,
while motoring in upstate New York, was stopped by defendant, a state trooper.
Defendant, not answering plaintiff's query, "What did I do wrong?," directed
plaintiff to follow him to the judge where an information was filed charging
plaintiff with speeding for which offense he was later adjudged guilty. Plaintiff
then brought an action for false arrest and the defendant was found guilty of
an illegal arrest because he had failed to inform plaintiff of the cause of the
arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed by a divided court. Upon appeal to the
Court of Appeals, held, three judges dissenting, reversed. There was no necessity
to state the cause of the arrest since the traffic infraction was a crime committed
in the defendant's presence. Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 136 N.E.2d
504 (1956).
A peace officer may arrest a person for a felony committed in his presence
without a warrant and without stating the cause of the arrest.' Where the crime
is a misdemeanor, however, such arrest was originally limited to violations constituting a breach of the peace.3 While this limitation has been retained by some
21. The concept is not novel. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 US. $93
(1926); Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1913). Both involved agreements
limiting the freedom of members to deal with non-members. Cf. Anderson v. United States,
171 U.S. 604 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 573 (1898); Interborough News Co.
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
22. By this rule, members were barred from representing insurance companies that operate
branch offices and solicit or sell insurance directly to the insured or contribute to the overhead expense of agents.
23. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 9; Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws 132-37 (1955) ; Comment, 58 Yale LJ. 1021, 1136 (1949).
1. Note, 25 Ky. L.J. 455, 456 (1953); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 201,

229 (1940).
2.

People v. Phillips, 284 N.Y. 235, 30 N.E.2d 438 (1940); Machen, Arrest Without a
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states, for the most part the authority has been extended to all other misdemeanors.3
In New York, sections 177 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure govern
the law of arrest and permit a peace officer to arrest a person for a crime committed in his presence provided he informs the person of his authority ". . . and
the cause of the arrest, except when the person arrested is in the actual commission of a crime. .. " Practical difficulties arise in other states where words
other than "crime" are used, 4 but by statute in New York, "crime" comprehends
both felonies and misdemeanors.5
The relation of traffic infractions, more particularly speeding violations which
were unknown at common law,0 to the law governing arrest presented itself with
the advent of the automobile to the courts. Traffic infractions being criminal, 7
the courts upheld the right of a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant
and without stating cause for a traffic infraction committed in his presence.8
Speeding was apparently a misdemeanor in New York also, but by section 2,
subdivision 29 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law "a traffic infraction is
not a crime" except that ". . . courts and judicial officers heretofore exercising
jurisdiction over such acts and violations as misdemeanors or otherwise shall
continue to exercise jurisdiction over traffic infractions as herein defined, and for
such purpose such acts and violations shall be deemed misdemeanors and all
provisions of law relating to misdemeanors . . . shall apply to traffic infractions. . . ." The lower courts had intimated that the concluding sentence of
subdivision 29 related only to jurisdiction and procedure and in all other respects
traffic infractions were not crimes. 10
Warrant in Misdemeanor Cases, 33 N.C.L. Rev. 17, 18 (1954); 25 So. Calif. L. Rev. 449,
450 (1952).
3. 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 6 (1937).
4. ". . . in some instances there is little to indicate that any thought was given to the
significance of the particular phrase chosen. When we consider, however, the difficulties often
encountered by the courts in determining such questions as whether the violation of every
law is a 'crime,' . . . then the importance of selecting a phrase which exactly describes the
type of misconduct to be included in the officer's power of arrest without warrant becomes
quite apparent." Machen, Arrest Without a Warrant in Misdemeanor Cases, 33 N.C.L. Rev.
17, 21 (1954).
5. N.Y. Penal Law § 2.
6. 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles § 37 (1936).
7. 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles § 806 (1936); 9-10 Huddy, Encyclopedia of Automobile Law
§ 96 (9th ed. 1931). One court referred to such violations as quasi-criminal. State v. Willhite, 40 N.J. Super. 405, 412, 123 A.2d 237, 240 (County Ct. 1956).
8. Stevens v. State, 274 P.2d 402 (Okla. Crim. 1954); Brown v. State, 159 Tex. CrIm.
306, 263 S.W.2d 261 (1953,; 9-10 Huddy, Encyclopedia of Automobile Law § 96 (9th ed. 1931).
9. Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 A.D.2d 760, 761, 147 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (4th Dep't 1955).
10. "The summary arrest, however, of a person charged with such a violation, Is not part
of the exercise of jurisdiction by a court or judicial officer." Breland v. Gray, 37 N.Y.S.2d
291, 294 (Sup. Ct. 1942); cf. People v. Propp, 172 Misc. 314, 15 N.Y.S.2d 83 (County Ct.
1939), rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.Y. 491, 31 N.E.2d 915 (1940); People v. Gilberg, 21
N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1940). Contra, People v. Space, 182 Misc. 783, 51
N.Y.S.2d 509 (County Ct. 1944).
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In the instant case, the majority construed this provision of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law to apply not merely to the procedure for the prosecution of traffic
infractions, but also to the ". . necessary steps preceding trial.... ."" Two
main reasons were given for this conclusion. First, the power given to the state
police to make arrests for traffic infractions would be a nullity if such offenses
were not crimes under section 180 of the Code. Secondly, a contrary decision
would require an officer to obtain a warrant of arrest first which would impede
".. . prompt and effective enforcement . . . [and] would favor nonresidents
over residents of the state without basis or reason."' 2
The dissent argued that by virtue of subdivision 29 speeding was a traffic
infraction alone and that the last sentence meant ". . .only that for purposes of
jurisdiction and procedure of 'courts and judicial officers,' traffic infractions continue to be handled like misdemeanors (but are not such for any other purpose),"m3 Thus, if the infraction was committed in the presence of the peace
officer a warrant would still be necessary, whereas under the reasoning of the
majority the lack of a warrant was immaterial since the infraction constituted
a crime.
The majority opinion would seem contrary to the express language of subdivision 29. Undoubtedly the legislature did not contemplate the precise situation here involved when this provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was first
adopted. Yet it seems clear that the legislature did intend to remove the penal
nature which had formerly attached to traffic infractions except in relation to the
practice of prosecution. Thus, the report of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles
remarked that: "[T] he various amendments are made .. .in accordance with
the general scheme of the chapter to take minor offenses out of the list of crimes
and make them traffic infractions."1 4
However, while it is true that by adopting the dissenting opinion the effect
upon enforcement of the vehicle and traffic laws would be greatly impaired and
would permit many traffic violators to escape punishment, nevertheless it is
impossible to escape the compelling language of subdivision 29 which renders
hardly tenuous the reasons indulged in by the majority. The majority opinion
begs the question in this instance by delving into the undesirable results which
might otherwise ensue. The legislature has inadvertently caused a loophole to
exist in the law which the majority has chosen to close, thus encroaching upon a
legislative function.
Conflict of Laws - Federal Tax Lien - State Recording Acts.--Certain
real property originally owned by A, was sold at public sale to the county commissioners by the county treasurer on May 1, 1940, because of delinquency in
real estate taxes. The deed from the treasurer to the commissioners was
recorded. On May 27, 1947, the commissioners sold the property to B. This
deed was never recorded. A federal tax lien was filed against B on October 19,
11.
12.
13.

1 N.Y.2d at 477, 136 N.E.2d at 503.
1 N.Y.2d at 478, 136 N.E.2d at 503.
1 N.Y.2d at 4S1, 136 N.E.2d at 510.

14. N.Y. Leg. Doc., 15Sth Leg. Sess., Vol. I, No. 11 (1935).
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1949, with the county prothonotary. On November 14, 1949, the county treasurer again sold the property, as A's, to the plaintiff's intestate. This deed was
properly recorded. Plaintiff brought this action against various defendants,
including the United States, to quiet title to the property. On plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment in the federal district court, held, motion granted. The
filing of a federal tax lien against an intervening purchaser who never recorded
his deed is not constructive notice to a subsequent innocent purchaser. Reiter
v. Kille, 143 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Under the recording acts of Pennsylvania all deeds, conveyances and contracts
purporting to transfer an interest in real property should be recorded.' The
purpose of this system is ". . . to give public notice in whom the title resides;
so that no one may be defrauded by deceptious appearance of title." 2 Accordingly, the effect of properly filing a deed is to limit the rights of a subsequent
purchaser, mortgagee or creditor with the same force as if he had joined in the
prior conveyance.3 Such registration is not essential, however, for the valid
transfer of title between the parties to the deed. 4 The failure to record a deed
is not available as a defense to a third party who subsequently acquires an
interest, where he had actual notice of the prior transaction, or the constructive notice of another party in real, visible and exclusive possession. 0 But the
failure to record a deed renders it void as to subsequent purchasers, mortgagees
or creditors who have innocently acquired their interests and recorded them.7
8
the court considered the
In Pennsylvania Range Boiler Co. v. Philadelphia,
question of whether a subsequent innocent purchaser of real estate could be
charged with notice of an award of damages to his predecessor in title to cover
future losses, when the only record was contained in the notes of testimony
before an administrative board. The court held that a subsequent purchaser
could not be bound by the award if it had not been recorded. Admittedly,
application of this Pennsylvania law alone to the facts of the present case shows
that the unrecorded deed and any interest relying upon it was not an effective
incumbrance on plaintiff's title.
A federal statute9 provides that a lien shall arise in favor of the United States for
neglect or refusal to pay taxes, against all property, whether real or personal, of
the tax delinquent. Normally the relative priority of interests is determined by
the application of the principle that the first in time is the first in right. 10 But
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§321-471 (1955). See N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 290-336 (1945)
for similar provisions.
2. Salter v. Reed, 15 Pa. 260, 263 (1850).
3. Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 21, § 357 (1955) ; Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931).
4. Malamed v. Sedelsky, 367 Pa. 353, 80 A.2d 853 (1951); In re Cray's Estate, 353 Pa.
25, 44 A.2d 286 (1945).
5. Jennings v. Bloomfield, 199 Pa. 638, 49 AtI. 135 (1901).
6. Smith v. Miller, 296 Pa. 340, 145 Atl. 901 (1929); Lazarus v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre
Coal Co., 246 Pa. 178, 92 Atl. 121 (1914).
7. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 351, 444 (1955).
8. 344 Pa. 34, 23 A.2d 723 (1942).
9.

26 U.S.C.A. § 6321 (1954).

10. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
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the statute provides that the lien shall not be valid against a subsequent purchaser, mortgagee or creditor, until notice of the lien has been filed in accordance
with the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is located."1 In United
States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,'- for example, the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of the federal tax lien where it had been filed in accordance with the
local law before the creditor obtained judgment. Conversely, in United States
v. Beaver Run Coal Co.,13 where the filing of a government lien followed the
execution of a mortgage, the court upheld the priority of the mortgagee's interest,
because the Government had disregarded the "positive legislative enactments
prescribing conditions essential to the existence and preservation of a statutory
lien."' 4 By application of these federal rules to the facts of the present case, the
federal tax lien was perfected by its filing in the office designated by the law of
Pennsylvania, 1 prior to the accrual of the interest of plaintiff's predecessor in
title.
In the present case the court followed the purpose of the Pennsylvania recording acts in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, because "it is clear
that Congress in enacting Section 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code [of 1939]
intended to give effect to the recording statutes of the several states." 0o
As it originally stood, the federal tax lien statute contained no exceptions or
limitations. 17 Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees or creditors were not exempted
from the incumbrance of a tax lien on property in which they had innocently
acquired an interest. Nor was the federal government required to observe the
local procedure for the filing of liens against property. In United States v.
Snyder 18 a lien arose in favor of the Government against the real property of the
defendant. The property was subsequently conveyed to an innocent purchaser
who maintained that, since the lien was not recorded in compliance with Louisiana
law, it was void against him, as the statute provided. The Court, in answer to
the self-posed question of ". . . whether the tax system of the United States is
subject to the recording laws of the States,"' 0 said that "if the United States...
in the collection of a tax admitted to be legitimate, can be thwarted by the plea of
a state statute prescribing that such a tax must be assessed and recorded under
state regulation .. .it would follow that the potential existence of the govern-

ment of the United States is at the mercy of state legislation." - The Court,
recognizing the difference and conflict among the laws of the states, held that to
subject the federal tax law to the laws of the states would be a violation of the
constitutional direction to assess and enforce taxes with uniformity. This same
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

26 US.CA. §6323 (a) (1) (1954).
340 U.S. 47 (1950).
99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938).
Id. at 613.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 2046 (1955).
Reiter v. Kille, 143 F. Supp. 590, 593 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Rev. Stat. § 3186 (1875).
149 U.S. 210 (1893).
Id. at 213.

20. Id. at 214.
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harsh result followed in United States v. Curry, where the defendant was also
an innocent subsequent purchaser. The court said that the ". . . government's
lien is unaffected by the fact that a subsequent incumbrancer or purchaser became
such without knowledge that the government had any interest in the property or
claim upon it."22 Because of the inequities caused by this section, Congress, in
1913, provided amendments designed to remove this element of secrecy from the
federal tax lien.2 3 The amendments exempted subsequent purchasers, mortgagees
and creditors from the incumbrance of the tax lien until notice of such lien was
filed with the appropriate local official, or, in the absence of state law to that
effect, with the clerk of the federal district court for that area.
Following a judicial direction to construe this section in favor of the Government,24 and considering the conditions which gave rise to the amendments, it is
submitted that the added limitations and exemptions effected only a procedural
change. Congress attempted to remove the secrecy from the lien by requiring
the Government to file notice of the lien. But once this limitation has been
observed by the Government, as it was in the instant case, 25the full force and
effect of the substantive basis of the Snyder case should apply.
The present case, therefore, presents ". . . another of the recurring conflicts
between the power to tax and the right to be free from taxation which are inevitable where two governments function at the same time and in the same
territory." 28
While the courts have not previously been confronted with the exact problems
of the instant case, they have in the application of this federal tax lien statute
generally upheld the superiority of the federal law when direct and indirect conflicts with state law have appeared. In Littlestown Nat'l Bank v. Penn Tile
Works Co., 27 the United States acquired a lien for unpaid taxes prior in time to
a lien of the state. Although a state statute provided that its lien should have
priority, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the federal law, as an
exercise of its constitutional power, was superior to the state law. In the case of
In re Dartmont Coal Co.,28 after the Government filed a tax lien with the clerk
of the federal district court, the legislature of West Virginia enacted legislation
which made it mandatory that all such liens be filed with the county clerk. In
21.
22.

201 Fed. 371 (D. Md. 1912).
Id. at 374.

23.

37 Stat. 1016 (1913).

24. In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F.2d 455, 458 (4th Cir. 1931).
25. Cf. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 52 (1950).
26. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 175 (1944). For decisions upholding
superiority of federal law, see, Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ; United States
v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941) ; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) ; Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188 (1938) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932). For decisions subordinating
federal law to state law, see R.F.C. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); Helvering v.
Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) ; Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940) ; Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101 (1930) ; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930) ; United States v. Cambridge Loan
& Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55 (1928).
27. 352 Pa. 238, 42 A.2d 606 (1945).
28. 46 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1931).
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deciding the superiority of the federal lien over a subsequent deed of trust the
court stated that "it is well settled that no state has the power to enact legislation affecting federal tax liens, except as permitted by an act of Congress."
The court, in its decision of the present case, placed great emphasis on the
purpose of the Pennsylvania recording system. The chaotic effects of allowing
the government lien to incumber plaintiff's title are implied. And yet there are
relevant issues not accorded the weight which they deserve. The aspects of
constitutional law and statutory construction outlined above might well afford
a basis for reversal. The objection as to harmful effects on the states' recording
structures by holding that the government lien does attach to a subsequent purchaser's property even where the prior deed was unrecorded could well be
answered by Chief Justice Marshall's reply to a similar objection in United States
v. Fisher:"The mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary
consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to
which the legislative power of congress extends."' ^0

Constitutional Law - Congressional Immunity - Power of Courts to
Enjoin Publication of Defamatory Document Published Pursuant to joint

Congressional Resolution.-The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee prepared a document concerning the Communist Party of the United States, which
contained material allegedly defaming plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this action
against members of the Subcommittee, seeking a declaration that the congressional resolution directing publication of the Senate document was unconstitutional, and an order enjoining defendants from printing and distributing the
document. The three judge district court, one judge dissenting, heed, the
courts had no power to prevent congressional publication of defamatory material, and the complaint, as to members of the Senate Subcommittee, must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Methodist Federation for Social Action v.
Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956).
Legislative immunity originated out of the struggle for supremacy between
the King and Parliament.' In England it vested in members of Parliament an
absolute privilege from civil or criminal proceedings, for statements made in
their places in the House.2 No absolute privilege attached, however, to republication outside the legislature, through unofficial distribution of reprints; 3 nor
to private publication by order of Parliament of documents that would have
29. Id. at 457. See also, Knox v. Great West Life Assur. Co., 212 F.2d 7-4 (6th Cir.
1954) ; United States v. Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Ryan, 124
F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1954) ; United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F. Supp. 453 (ED. Mich. 1938).
30. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805).
1. Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 733 (D.D.C.
1956).
2. Ex parte Wason, L.R. 4 Q.B.573 (1869).
3. Rex v. Abingdon, 1 Esp. 226, 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (K.B. 1794); Rex v. Creevey, 1 X.
& S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (KB. 1813).
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been absolutely privileged within its walls. Later, by an act of Parliament,
the privilege was extended to include such private publication by order of
Parliament, and subsequent decisions have held that where publication is by a
member of the legislature, in good faith and for the information of his constituents, a privilege prevails. "The basis of so drastic and rigid a rule is the
overbalancing of the individual hurt by the public necessity for untrammeled
freedom of legislative and administrative activity. ..."
In the American colonies the immunity was recognized in the state legislatures and Houses of Burgesses,8 and was later incorporated into the Constitution
in art. I, section 6 which provides, "Speech or Debate in either House . ..
shall not be questioned in any other Place." 9 An early Massachusetts' case,
Coffin v. Coffin,' construing a similar provision in that state's constitution,
extended the immunity beyond mere speech and debate, ". . . to every other
act resulting from the nature and in the execution of the office."'" Thus, anything said within the walls of the legislature and within the legislative role was
absolutely privileged. The "legislative role" has been liberally defined, by
state12 and federal' 3 decisions, to include whatever is said in the course of the
legislative proceedings themselves. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 4 the Supreme
Court, in adopting the view of Coffin v. Coffin, quoted with approval a dictum
of that case to the effect that ". . . there are cases in which he [the legislative
member] is entitled to this privilege when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber."' 5 The Supreme Court further noted that in the event of
"an utter perversion" of the legislators' powers to "a criminal purpose"' 0 the
Court was not prepared to say that they would be protected by the constitutional
privilege, thus indicating that there might be a limit to the liberal rule in an
extreme case. The Supreme Court stated, however, in Tenney v. Brandhovc,17
that the rights of private individuals would be sustained when Congress was
found to be acting "outside its legislative role," noting that in order to find that
a committee had acted outside its legislative role ". . . it must be obvious that

4.

Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839).

5.

3 & 4 Vict., c. 9 (1840).

6. Davison v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bi. 229, 233, 119 Eng. Rep. 1233, 1234 (Q.B. 1857);
Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 95 (1868).
7. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
8. Yankwich, Immunity of Congressional Speech, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 960, 965 (1951).
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl.1.
10. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
11. Id. at 27.
12. Cole v. Richards, 108 N.J.L. 356, 158 Atl. 466 (1932) ; Field, Constitutional Privileges
of Legislators, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 442 (1925).
13. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1930).

14. Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra note 13.
15. Id. at 203-04.
16. Id. at 205.
17.

341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
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there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the judiciary or the
Executive."'
The majority, in the instant case, based its decision upon art. I, section 6 of
the Constitution. They argued further that just as there is nothing in the
Constitution which authorizes anyone to prevent the President of the United
States, or the Supreme Court, from publishing any statement, so also there is
no authority for enjoining the publication of any statement by Congress. The
court maintained that the judicial power to declare legislation unconstitutional
does not import a power to censor congressional language considered libelous.
The majority cited a federal court of appeals case, Hearst v. Black,19 which held
that it would be an encroachment upon the constitutional separation of powers
for a court to enjoin members of a Senate Committee from publishing telegrams
allegedly acquired by unconstitutional means. In the instant case this proposition was given added weight because the publication had been ordered by a joint
resolution rather than by a committee as in the Hearst case. The majority
opinion concluded that if a congressional publication should contain erroneous
and defamatory statements with unfortunate results for the persons affected,
Congress alone has the power to rectify the wrong.
The dissenting opinion argued that the publication of the document in question, being for general distribution throughout the United States, is an activity
beyond the legislative function and is, therefore, beyond absolute privilege. The
dissent cited Tenney v. Brandhove in support of the contention that the privilege is absolute only with regard to acts within the scope of the legislative
activity.
The dissenting opinion is primarily concerned with the potentially harsh
effects of the liberal immunity rule. The conflict, however, between the rights
of an individual and the necessity that legislators be immune from deterrents
to the discharge of their duties, has been resolved by the courts in favor of the
latter. Regarding abuse of the privilege the court in Cochran v. CouzensF0
stated that the legislators will presumably be restrained in the exercise of the
privilege by the responsibilities of their office. In the event of their failure in
that regard, they are by constitutional provision - ' subject to discipline by their
colleagues. In the Hearst case, in which the court held itself without jurisdiction to restrain the Federal Communications Commission from using or disclosing the contents of messages seized without authority, it was also said,
"If it be insisted that this is the acknowledgment of a power whose plenitude
may become a cataclysm, the answer is that the Congress 'is as much the
The
guardian of the liberties and welfare of the people as the courts. . . '
fundamental consideration on which the majority decision is based, however, is
that the constitutional immunity provision is grounded on a public policy which
protects unlimited freedom in speeches and debates. The interests of the people
18. Id. at 378.
19. S7 F.2d 68 (D. C. Cir. 1936).
20. 42 F.2d 783, 784 (D. C. Cir. 1930).

21. U.S. Const. art I, § 5, cL 2.
22. 87 F.2d at 72.
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are best supported by enabling their representatives to exercise the functions of
their office without fear of civil or criminal prosecution.
The principal question on which the majority and dissenting opinions disagree
seems to be whether or not the publication by Congress of the particular
document in question was an act within the legislative role. The majority fails
to mention that the privilege applies only to acts within the scope of the legislative functions, while the dissent contends that the act in question was not
within this scope. It would seem that any document which relates to a subject
within the legitimate scope of Congress' investigative power and which is
ordered published by concurrent resolution of Congress, for the general
information and protection of its nationwide constituency, constitutes an act
within the legislative role. The distribution of the documents would, therefore,
be an official legislative function for the protection of the general welfare. Thus,
despite the failure of the majority to make mention of it, the limitation relied
upon by the dissenting opinion would appear to be inapplicable in the instant
case.

Constitutional Law - Full Faith and Credit - Jurisdiction Over Custody
of Infants.-Husband and wife, domiciliaries of California, entered into a
separation agreement, wherein the husband agreed to support their children and
the wife was given custody, provided that she would not remove them from that
state without the written consent of the husband or an order of a California
court. The following year the wife secured a Nevada consent divorce decree
which awarded her custody of the children. The wife returned to California and
remarried. Subsequently she instituted a California action against the first
husband to enforce the provision of the separation agreement requiring his
support of the children. While that action was pending, the second husband, the
wife, and the children moved to New York without permission of either the
first husband or a California court. The first husband then counterclaimed in
the California support action and obtained a default judgment against the wife
whereby the wife was required to return the children to California pursuant to
the terms of the separation agreement. The wife's appeal of this California judgment was pending when her present New York equity suit was instituted, in
which she sought a determination fixing the residence of the children in New
York. Special Term denied the petition. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division,
First Department, held, all justices concurring, reversed. A state in which the
children reside is not required to give full faith and credit or accord comity to
the custody decree of a sister state, ". . . when it conflicts with the dominant
domestic duty of the courts to guard the welfare of its wards." Hicks v. Bridges,
2 A.D.2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1956).
In early England the king, as parens patriae, exercised the right to care for
"infants, lunatics and idiots, that cannot take care of themselves."' This power
was delegated to the Chancellor, and ultimately to the courts of chancery.2 Thus
1. Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, Gilb. Rep. 172, 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1725).
2. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1304 (5th ed. 1941).
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equity has always extended special protection to infants. New York's equity
court was early recognized as possessing this power; the Court of Appeals held
3
it to be "one of its most sacred, and most worthy and most important duties,"
having its origin in "the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless."
A court of equity may exercise this power quite freely where the custody of the
child is being adjudicated for the first time, but where a prior adjudication has
taken place in another state, the constitutional requirement of full faith and
credit must be considered.
The Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the judicial proceedings of every other stateY Congress, in implementing
this clause, has provided that the judicial proceedings ". .. shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . .as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State. . . ."0 The Supreme Court has
further defined full faith and credit by holding that a court must give full faith
and credit where the original court had proper jurisdiction of the parties and of
the subject matter,7 and where the proceeding was binding within that state, and
was not subject to modification or collateral attack.8 If the plenary court's
adjudication lacks either jurisdiction or finality, the court of a sister state is not
bound to give it full faith and credit.
A court seeking to relitigate a custody judgment must first consider whether
the foreign court had proper jurisdiction. Custody of an infant is usually decided
as part of a matrimonial action 0 and since jurisdiction over matrimonial actions
is based upon the legal concept of domicile,10 this concept has often been applied
to infants as well. At common law the domicile of the child was held to be with
the father, regardless of the residence of the child. 1 Some states have provided
by statute that the child's domicile is with both parents when the family is
together,1 and when separated with the parent with whom the child is residing.' 3
In May v. Anderson'4 a family was domiciled in Wisconsin, and the wife, without
the husband's consent, removed the children to Ohio, and took up domicile there.
The husband obtained an ex parte divorce decree in Wisconsin granting him
custody of the children. The Supreme Court, acknowledging the validity of the
divorce decree, refused to give full faith and credit to the custody portion of the
decree, stating: "We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile
because, even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin . .. the
3.
4.
5.
6.

Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575, 578 (1856).
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1950).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.. 610, 614 (1947).
See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1140, 1170.
See note 7 supra.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 30 (1934).
N.Y. Dom. Rel Law § 81.
Matter of Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 14S N.E. 630 (1925); Restatement, Conflict of Laws

§ 32.

14. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her
personal right to their immediate possession."' 5 , Where parents are domiciled in
separate jurisdictions, the parent seeking a custody decree must have either in
personam jurisdiction over the other party or immediate physical possession of
the child. Thus jurisdiction sufficient to sustain a matrimonial judgment is not
necessarily enough to sustain a custody decree, and, to some extent at least, in
personam jurisdiction has replaced domicile as the basis for a custody decree.
If the foreign court had proper jurisdiction, then the court in the state in
which relitigation is sought must determine whether the judgment or order issued
was a final one, or whether it was subject to modification. Most jurisdictions
provide by statute that a custody judgment may be altered or modified at any
time after judgment.' 6 However, most courts in interpreting these statutes have
applied what is known as the change of circumstances rule, requiring that the
petitioner establish some additional facts upon which the courts can justify a
modification of the decree. Courts of sister states have rightly concluded that
where an infant is brought within their jurisdiction they can also modify or alter
the decree, provided that circumstances would have justified the original court
in doing so. Such a relitigation does not violate the full faith and credit clause,
since ". . . a judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive or final
effect in the State of the forum that it has in the State where rendered."' 7 In
most jurisdictions, the absence of a change of circumstances renders a decree
8
binding.'
Where a custody decree is issued with proper jurisdiction and is binding within
the state, the question of whether it is entitled to full faith and credit in a sister
state is not entirely settled. The Supreme Court has not given a conclusive
answer,' 9 and courts of equity have exercised their power as they saw fit. In
People ex rel. Allen v. Allen,20 New York's Court of Appeals refused to grant full
faith and credit to a foreign custody decree, regarding it simply as ". . . a fact
or circumstance bearing upon the discretion to be exercised without dictating or
controlling it." 21 Later in Ansorge v. Arinour2 the same court held that a foreign
custody decree was entitled to full faith and credit. The court asserted that
".. . the custody may be changed when circumstances or treatment since the
decree render it necessary for the child's best interests, but until some such facts
appear our courts cannot change the .. .decree simply because they do not
15. Id. at 534.
16. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 70; Cal. Civ. Code § 138 (Deering Supp. 1955).
17. 330 U.S. at 614.
18. In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey no change of circumstances was shown, but
the husband had not appeared personally in the Florida action. Under Florida's laws the
husband had the right to attack the judgment collaterally at any time. Therefore the United
States Supreme Court held that it could be attacked in New York without violating full
faith and credit.
19. 330 U.S. at 615-16.
20.
21.
22.

105 N.Y. 628, 11 N.E. 143 (1887).
Id. at 628, 11 N.E. at 144.
267 N.Y. 492, 196 N.E. 546 (1935).
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agree with the decision." 23 Numerous decisions followed based on the principles
laid down
in Ansorge v. Armour, and it seemed to be the settled law of New
York.2
However, in Bachman v. Mejias2 the Court of Appeals recently reconsidered
the question, and refused to abide by the custody order of a foreign court,
asserting that "the full faith and credit clause does not apply to custody
decrees. ' '26 The court stated: "The responsibility for the welfare of infants
endows the court with the power to determine custody irrespective of the residence and domicile of the parents and prior custody orders in a foreign juris27
diction."
In the instant case the infant had been removed from the foreign jurisdiction
and brought to New York while litigation was pending in the foreign jurisdiction. The foreign court had in personam jurisdiction, and the petition which the
wife made in New York could have been made in the foreign court of plenary
jurisdiction. The instant case, however, citing the Bachman case as authority,
held that New York could hear the petition. Admitting that the foreign court
had valid jurisdiction over the parties, the court still maintained that the
physical presence of the children gave it a paramount jurisdiction, "albeit
limited in basis to the health and welfare of the children." 29
New York bases its right to deny full faith and credit to a foreign custody
decree on the equitable power inherited from the English equity courts. However the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and where it conflicts with
the common law the latter must yield. New York claims a duty to act where
the health and welfare of the infant within the state is affected. In Sherrcr v.
Sherre?2 9 the Supreme Court considered the somewhat analogous plea that the
state had the duty to protect the marital and family relationships of its residents,
and could therefore refuse to grant full faith and credit to a foreign decree. The
Court held that the full faith and credit clause applied, and ruled: "If in its
application local policy must at times be required to give way, such 'is part of
the price of our federal system.' "Zo
The rule enunciated in Ansorge v. Armour is more consistent with the
23. Id. at 499, 196 N.E. at 548.
24. People ex rel.
Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E.2d 255 (1942); People ex rel.
Scanlon v. Ciaravalli, 2 A.D.2d 702, 152 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dep't 1956); Sutera v. Sutera, 1
A.D.2d 356, 150 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1956); Finston v. Bernstein, 275 App. Div. 928, 90
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1949); Young v. Roe, 265 App. Div. 858, 37 N.Y.S.2d 714 (2d
Dep't 1942); Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 256 App. Div. 1032, 10 N.Y.S.2d 699 (4th Dep't
1939); People ex rel.
Tull v. Tull, 245 App. Div. 503, 283 N.Y. Supp. 183 (Ist Dep't 1935),
aff'd, 270 N.Y. 619, 1 N.E.2d 359 (1936). Contra, Matter of Bull (Hellman), 266 App. Div. 290,
42 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Ist Dep't 1943); People ex rel. Turk v. Turk, 86 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. CL.
1949).
25. 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956).
26. Id. at 580, 136 N.E.2d at 86S.
27. Id. at 581, 136 N.E2d at 869.
28. 2 A.D.2d at 340, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
29. 334 U.S. 343 (194S).
30. Id. at 355.
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Supreme Court's reasoning in Sherrer v. Sherrer and in May v. Anderson. The
court being petitioned should first determine whether the prior decree was made
with valid jurisdiction. If it was, then the court should determine whether it was
a final adjudication as to the facts raised by the petition. Once jurisdiction and
finality are established, the custody decree should be binding on the court by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Where a modification would be justified
under the law of the sister state, New York could modify also.
The New York position, exemplified in the Bachman case and the instant case,
may well result in attempted evasions of judicial process. It may encourage
parents to ignore court custody orders, and to flee a restraining judgment in other
jurisdictions, seeking a relitigation in New York in hope of a more favorable
result. The constitutional requirement of full faith and credit was designed to
prevent such practices, and it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will allow
an exception in the case of custody decrees.
Criminal Law - Pleading - Right of Appeal by the United States to the
Supreme Court from a Motion Dismissing the Indictment.-Defendant,

indigent because his assets had been subjected to a jeopardy assessment by the
Government, was indicted for attempted evasion of income tax. The courtappointed defense attorney moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that,
since the Government proposed to use the "net worth" method in proving its
case, he could not effectively defend his client without the aid of a competent
accountant. During the argument of the motion the district court indicated that
unless the Government released sufficient funds to defendant to enable him to
hire an accountant, the indictment would be dismissed. The Government
claimed that it was legally unable to release such funds and the court dismissed
the indictment. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, one judge dissenting,
the Government's motion for certification to the Supreme Court, denied.
Defendant's motion below, for dismissal of the indictment, was, in substance, a
"plea in abatement" and, therefore, could not be appealed to the Supreme Court.
United States v. Brodson, 234 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1956).
Originally there was no right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States and cases were brought before it by a writ of error.' However, in 1928
the writ of error was abolished and all relief which could be obtained thereby
could thereafter be taken on appeal 2 This right of appeal, both in criminal and
civil cases, has always been given only by express statutory provision.8 On
appeal an important distinction was made between "pleas in bar" and "pleas in
abatement." A plea in abatement, as understood at common law, was a dilatory
plea which brought to the attention of the court some fact or circumstance, not
1.

34 Stat. 1246 (1907).

2. 45 Stat. 54 (1928).
3. Ex parte Pennsylvania, 109 U.S. 174 (1883) ; Castro v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
46 (1865); Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 76 F.2d 943, (1st Cir.), af'd,
296 U.S. 459 (1935) ; In re Gelino's, Inc., 51 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1931) ; In re Maryanov, 20
F.2d 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1927).
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disclosed on the face of the record, which would temporarily suspend the action
without defeating it absolutely. Pleas in abatement were not to the merits but
to the form of the action. 4 A plea in bar on the other hand raised matters, not
appearing on the face of the complaint, which went to the merits of the cause
of action and barred its prosecution absolutely. Though a sustained plea in
bar had been appealable to the Supreme Court since 1928,0 a plea in abatement
was not appealable until 1942 and then only in certain cases.7 This restrictive
policy seems to have stemmed from the unwillingness of the appellate courts to
review anything but final decrees.8
Shortly before the revision, in 1948, of the section governing appeals by the
Government to the Supreme Court in criminal cases," the terms "plea in bar"
and "plea in abatement" were abolished by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.' 0 Consequently the present section governing appeals by the United
States makes no mention of the terms "plea in bar" and "plea in abatement."
It does, however, provide that an appeal can be taken by or on behalf of the
United States in all criminal cases "from a decision or judgment sustaining
a motioa in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.""
The majority opinion does not discuss the meaning of the term "motion in
bar" but assumes that it has precisely the same meaning as the term "plea in
bar" as understood prior to its abolition by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, takes a different view. It
points out that no statutory definition of the words "motion in bar" is available and that ".... nothing in the relevant legislative history bearing upon
section 3831 [sic] sheds any light on the meaning of a 'motion in bar. ""
This statement of the dissent casts some doubt on the unhesitating assumption
4. For definitions of plea in abatement see: McCray v. Barth, 34 Ariz. 43, 267 Pac. 421
(1928); Whitaker v. Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 8S9 (1930); Curl v. Ingram, 121 W. Va.
763, 6 S.E.2d 4S3 (1939); Binsfeld v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 552, 15 N.VW2d 823
(1944). See also 41 Am. Jur., Pleading §§ 124, 130 (1942).
5. For definitions of a plea in bar see: Carter v. Solomon, 54 Ga. App. 517, 188 SE.
545 (1936); David v. David, 161 Ald. 532, 157 At. 755 (1932). See also 41 Am. Jur., Pleading
§ 131 (1942); 71 CJ.S., Pleading § 140 (1941); 40 CJ., Pleading § 263 (1930).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. 56 Stat. 271 (1942).
S. Shoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Line, 294 US. 454 (1935); Collins v. Metro-Goldyn
Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Broude, 299 Fed. 332 (D. Minn.
1924). The reason for this policy seems to have been well stated in the oft cited cae of
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 US. (6 How.) 201 (1898), where the Court -aid, "In limiting the
right of appeal to the Supreme Court to final decrees, it v,as obviously the object of the law

to save the unnecessary expense and delay of repeated appeals in the mie suit; and to
have the whole case and every matter in controversy in it decided in a single appeal." However
this reasoning has been criticized. See Stern and Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, at 371-73
(2d ed. 19S4) and The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539 (1932).
9. Title 18 of the United States Code was completely revised by Act of June 25, 1948, c.
645, 62 Stat. 63 (1948).

10. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
12. 234 F.2d at 100. The opinion was obviously referring to § 3731.
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of the majority. However, even if we grant this assumption, the decision still
presents some difficulty.
The majority, in considering the classification of the motion below, set out
definitions of the terms plea in bar and plea in abatement. It then concluded
that the motion in question, because it does not go to the merits of the charge,
is, in substance, a plea in abatement and therefore not appealable. The Government, however, argued that though the motion has some characteristics of a
plea in abatement, nevertheless, because it could not legally release funds to
the defendant in this case, the motion had the effect of a plea in bar and
should be held to be in bar of the action. The court cryptically rejected this
argument saying that the Government's statement of inability to release funds
was surely not the last word on the subject.
The dissent was of the opinion that it should be assumed, for the purposes
of deciding this case, that the Government is correct in claiming to be legally
unable to release funds to the defendant, thus deciding the question before the
court ". . . within the framework of the challenged ruling and ... [refraining] from speculation about the future.' 3 From this premise the dissent concluded that the plea effectively dismisses the action and should have been ruled
a motion in bar. However, since there has been no definite ruling on this
question of the Government's ability to release funds to the defendant, the
conclusion of the dissent seems as much based on speculation as that of the
majority. It is suggested that neither conclusion can be judged valid until it
is finally determined as a matter of law whether the Government may or may
not release funds to the defendant.
From the governing statute it would appear that the Government is unable
to release funds in this case. 14 The statute provides for release of all property
subject to liens of the Bureau of Internal Revenue when the liability for the
amount assessed plus interest has been satisfied or becomes unenforceable or
when a bond has been furnished which is conditioned upon payment of the full
amount assessed plus interest within the time prescribed by law. The statute
also provides for release of part of the property subject to a lien in certain cases,
but these provisions seem inapplicable because of the nature of a jeopardy
assessment.
It is submitted that, upon a finding that the Government cannot release
funds to the defendant in the instant case, the motion in question must be
adjudged a motion in bar. In the light of recent legislative attempts to free
pleading from the abstruse formalism by which it had so long been hindered it
is difficult to imagine a motion such as this, which finally determines an action,
as being anything but a motion in bar.
13.
14.

Id. at 101.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6325.
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Criminal Law - Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-Defendant was convicted of
first degree robbery and sentenced in 1940 to a term of ten to thirty years. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant moved for a writ of error comm
nobis to vacate the judgment of conviction upon the ground that his rights were
violated since he was not present in the courtroom for the reading to the jury
of certain testimony which it had requested to hear during its deliberations.
The facts upon which defendant based his application appeared as part of the
printed record. Held, motion denied. The writ of error comm nobis will not lie
to correct an error of fact appearing on the record. People v. Shapiro, 153
N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1956).
Coram nobis, which may be translated literally "before us, ourselves," is an
ancient common law writ, dating from before the sixteenth century. At common
law, it was directed to the court of King's Bench, requiring that court to inquire
into a judgment rendered by it on account of some error of fact affecting the
validity of the proceedings.'
The writ fell into disuse in England, but it was brought into the jurisprudence
of the United States at an early date.2 It has been abolished in a number of
jurisdictions where other, statutory methods of relief, such as a motion to
vacate a judgment, are prescribed. In those states where coram nobis is still
available, the writ will lie only to correct errors of fact, not apparent on the
record, for which no other legal remedy exists.4
Although necessarily connected with the judgment it seeks to correct, coram
nobis is in the nature of a new civil suit, and differs from the ordinary writ of
error in that it does not remove the case to a higher court for review, but is
directed to the court rendering judgment.
A defendant, moving for a writ of error coram nobis, is entitled to a trial
upon any issues of fact not conclusively refuted by unquestionable documentary
proof. A denial of the motion, without a trial, where there has been no such
refutation, would constitute a deprivation of due process.3
Some courts have held that the writ must be filed before the end of the court
term, and that a court may not recall its adjudications after a lapse of term,0
while other courts have held that there is no limitation as to when the applica7
tion may be made.
In New York, until recently, no appeal could be made from an order granting
1. Address by Associate Judge Stanley H. Fuld, Broome County Bar A-ociation, 117
N.Y.L.J. No. 130, p. 2212 (June 5, 1947), No. 131, p. 2230 (June 6, 1947), No. 132, p. 2243
(June 7, 1947).
2. Ibid.
3. Young v. United States, 13S F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1943); State v. Hayslip, 90 Ohio St.
199, 107 N.E. 335 (1914) ; State v. Rathie, 101 Ore. 363, 200 Pac. 790 (1921).

4. People v. Kendricks, 300 N.Y. 944, S9 N.E.2d 257 (1949) ; People v. Sadnez, 300 N.Y.
69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949); Alexander v. State, 20 Wyo. 241, 123 Pac. 63 (1912); State v.
Asbell, 62 Kan. 209, 61 Pac. 690 (1900).
5. People v. Langan, 303 N.Y. 474, 104 N.E.2d 861 (1952); People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y.
290, 97 N.E.2d 903 (1951).
6. State v. Stanley, 225 Mo. 525, 125 S.W. 475 (1910).
7. People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290,.97 N.E.2d 903 (1951).
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or denying a motion for a writ of error coram nobis in a criminal action.8 The

state, however, could avoid this restriction somewhat, by obtaining an order
from a higher court in the nature of a prohibition, to prevent the lower court
from acting on the application. This has now been remedied by statute, and an
appeal may be made by both the defendant and the state. 10
The instant case is the first, in New York, for which a writ of error coram
nobis has been sought on the basis of defendant's absence when testimony was
read to the jury at its request.
Most cases in which coram nobis has been granted involve either the perpetration of a fraud upon the court, or a clear denial of the defendant's constitutional
rights. Thus, in New York, the writ has been granted in cases where the
defendant's plea of guilty has been induced by fraud or misrepresentation."
Judgments have been vacated under this writ where the court has failed to
advise the defendant of his right to counsel, 12 and where a conviction has been
obtained by the use of testimony known by the prosecutor to be perjured.18
While it is true that a fundamental right of defendant was violated at the
trial, at least two legal remedies existed for the correction thereof. His conviction could have been reversed upon either of two sections of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure. 1 4 The appeal, based on different grounds, raised
neither section, and it is clear that New York courts will not set aside a judgment, years after its entry, for errors which could have been presented upon
appeal. 15 Therefore, since the defect was apparent on the record, and one for
which an adequate means of relief existed, the writ of error coram nobis was
properly denied.

Descent and Distribution - Pretermitted Children - No Contest Clause.
-Plaintiff's father's will left his estate to his widow. The will provided that
". .. if any person who if I die intestate would be entitled to share in my
estate, shall, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly contest the
will . . . then I hereby bequeath to each such person the sum of One Dollar."
Plaintiff's claim that she was a pretermitted heir and entitled to share in the
estate was rejected in the Superior Court. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court
of California, held, two justices dissenting, affirmed. The statement in the will,
that any person who, if testator had died intestate, would be entitled to share
in his estate, was a provision which included the testator's daughter and she
was not, therefore, a pretermitted child. Van Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal. 2d 705, 299
P.2d 1 (1956).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945).
Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, 296 N.Y. 1, 68 N.E.2d 849 (1946).
N.Y. Code Cr. Proc. §§ 517-19.
Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
Bojinoff v. People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1949).
Morhous v. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 56 N.E.2d 79 (1944).
N.Y. Code Cr. Proc. §§ 427, 465.
See note 9 supra.
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At common law a pretermitted' heir, that is, an omitted heir, has no rights
in the estate disposed of in the will. 2 This common law rule in most states has
been altered or abrogated by statute in order to guard against testamentary
thoughtlessness.3 The statutes usually provide that an omitted child is entitled
to a share in the estate of the testator equivalent to that which he would have
received had the decedent died intestate.4 While these statutes vary, all courts
are inaccord that where the claimant is expressedly named or specifically identified by the language of the will, or where a nominal gift is made to a named
child, such child is not pretermitted and the statute does not apply.5 The
applicability of the statute is also precluded by the use of words such as
"children" or "relatives" in a will since they are generally considered as a
sufficient identification of the claimant.6 Here the unanimity of the courts ends
and the effect of more generic terms used in a will can be determined only by
resorting to the provisions of the statute of the particular state in which the
question arises. These statutes, however, may be divided into two major classes.
The first class 7 generally provides that if a person dies leaving a child not
named or provided for in his last will, the testator shall be deemed to have died
intestate as to the child. These statutes omit all reference to intention. Under
this class the courts have generally held that the child was not named or provided for, and therefore, as pretermitted, entitled to share in the estate as if
the testator had died intestate in the following instances: where the will provided that "heirs" be disinherited, 8 or where it contained a general disinheriting
clause, formulated in the broadest and most general terms, comprising provisions
by which all others than those specifically named in the will were declared to
be excluded from sharing in the estate,9 or where the will contained a "no
contest" clause.' 0 The reasoning in such cases is that there is a presumption
1. From the Latin pretermission which at Roman law meant the ominion by a testator
to mention an heir in his will.
2. 1 Page, Wills § 525 (3d ed. 1941) ; Easterlin v. Easterlin, 62 Fla. 46S, 56 So. 639 (1911).
3. McLean v. McLean, 207 N.Y. 365, 101 N.E. 178 (1913); Porter v. Porter's Ex'r. 120
Ky.302, 86 S.W. 546 (1905).

4. Rowe v. Allison, 87 Ark. 206, 112 S.W. 395 (1903).
5. Miller v. Aven, 327 Mlo. 20, 34 S.W.2d 116 (1930) ; Achelis v. Murgrove, 212 Ala. 47,
101 So. 670 (1924) ; In re Barter's Estate, 86 Cal. 441, 25 Pac. I (1890) ; Terry v. Foster,
1 MIass. 146 (1804).

6. In re Phillips' Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P.2d 1015 (1938) ; In re Dooling's Will, 15S
Misc. 333, 285 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct. 1936); In re Trickett's Estate, 197 Cal. 20, 239
Pac. 406 (1925); Shackelford v. Houghton, 180 Ala. 675, 60 So. 320 (1912); R~hoton v.
Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 34 Pac. 513 (1893).
7. Ala., Ark., Ga., Ky., Mo., N.C., N.H., N.M., Ore., Pa., Wash., N.Y. (applicable only to

children born after the making of the will).
8. Bowman v. Bowman, 49 Fed. 329 (9th Cir. 1892); In re Bauer's Estate, S Wash. 2d
165, 105 P.2d 11 (1940).
9. Grace v. Hildebrandt, 110 Okla. 1S, 237 Pac. 98 (1925); In re Barker's Estate, S Wash.
83, 31 Pac. 976 (1892); Hargadine v. Pulte, 27 Alo. 423 (1353); Block v. Bloch, 3 Mo. 594

(1S34).
10.

Goff v. Goff, 352 Mlo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); Yeates v. Yeates, 179 Ark. 543,

16 S.W.2d 996 (1929); Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 428, 259 Pac. 299 (1927).
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that the child was omitted unintentionally and that the words are not sufficient
to rebut the presumption, and therefore cannot be held as to include the
particular child. In the case of a "no contest" clause the child is held pretermitted also on the theory that the child claimed under the statute and hence
was not a contestant of the will but takes independently of it.
The statutes of the second class' provide that if the testator omits to provide
in his will for any of his children, such child shall receive a share of the estate
as in the case of intestacy unless it appears that the omission was intentional
and not occasioned by accident or mistake. 12 Under this class it is generally
held that the child is not pretermitted, where the testator disinherits his
14
"heirs,"' 13 or all other persons in a general disinheriting clause, because such
provisions are considered as showing an intention of the testator to exclude his
children from participating in his estate. The courts seem to wrestle with the
construction of wills with "no contest" clauses in determining the intention
of the testator. While the courts agree, where the "no contest" clause contains
the word anyone or its like that this is not sufficient to exclude the child from
taking his legal share from the estate,' 0 they are divided where the disinherited
group in the "no contest" clause is described by the word "heirs" or words of
similar import. Thus in In re Allmaras's Estate,1 where a testator described
himself in his will as a single man without living issue and declared that the
omission of any other persons than those designated as beneficiaries, whether
claiming to be an heir or not, was intentional and provided that ". . . 'if any
person, whether a beneficiary under this will or not . . .shall contest this
will, . ..such person should receive $1.00 and no more' ... ,,.17 the California court reasoned that the two sons of the testator were intentionally
excluded and hence were not pretermitted heirs. The same court in In re
Dixon's Estate,'8 where the will contained a provision that if "'. . . any other
person who, if I died . . . intestate, would be entitled to share in my estate,
shall, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, contest this Will or
attack, . .. I hereby bequeath to such person or persons the sum of One
Dollar . . .,' "19 held that a child of the testator was mentioned in the will.
11.

Cal., Conn., Ill., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., Okla., R.I., Utah,

Wis.
12. For a general discussion of the statutes see Dainow, Inheritance by Pretermitted
L. Rev. 1 (1937); Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes,
Children, 32 Ill.
29 Colum. L. Rev. 748 (1929).
13. In re Minear's Estate, 180 Cal. 239, 180 Pac. 535 (1919) ; In re Hassel's Estate, 168
Cal. 287, 142 Pac. 838 (1914).
14. In re Cochem's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 2d 634, 247 P.2d 131 (1952) ; Smith v. Smith,
,62 R.I. 52, 2 A.2d 896 (1938); Ritger v. Montefusco, 94 N.J. Eq. 652, 120 Atl. 791 (Ch.
1923).

15. In re Cochran's Estate, 116 Cal. App. 2d 98, 253 P.2d 41 (1953) ; In re Price's Estate,

56 Cal. App. 2d. 335, 132 P.2d 485
16.

(1942).

24 Cal. App. 2d 457, 75 P.2d 557 (1938).

17. Id. at 461, 75 P.2d at 559.
18. 28 Cal. App. 2d 598,83 P.2d 98 (1938).

19. Id. at 599,83 P.2d at 98.
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The court said: "It is our duty to give some meaning to this clause if we can
reasonably do so."2 0 Under an almost identical clause in a will an opposite
result was reached in the Nevada case, In re Ray's Estate.2 ' In that case the
court held that this was insufficient to disinherit a son for the lack of a clear
intent to disinherit this particular plaintiff. The court said that the criterion
should not be whether the person is a member of the class excluded by the will,
but rather whether there is a clear indication of testamentary intent to disinherit any particular person of the class or group mentioned in the "no contest"
clause.
The instant case on review was governed by a statute of the second class.2
The court was of the opinion that the testator disinherited the plaintiff intentionally because she was a person who would be entitled to share in the estate
had her father died intestate and that the father, using the language he did, meant
his heirs, and distinguished this case from those cases in which "no contest" clauses
related to anyone and not to heirs. The dissenting opinion argued that the
testator did not show in his will that he had his child in mind and intentionally
omitted to provide for her, and that he had apparently forgotten her. There is
no doubt that the decision is in accord with the California law. However,
California's position is not free from doubt since the statute is designed to
protect the child unless there is convincing proof that the testator had his child
in mind but nevertheless intentionally excluded him from sharing in the estate.
The position taken by the Nevada court23 more accurately reflects the spirit
and purpose of the statute.
Taxation - Procedure in the Net Worth Method of Prosecution.-Appellant was convicted of willful evasion of income taxes for the years 1946 through
1949. Among the 580 exhibits admitted during the complicated trial was a
statement of the combined net worth of the defendant, his wife and others who
were not charged under the indictment. The court instructed the jury as to the
occasions when the use of the net worth method is permissible but restricted its
charge on the nature of the method to an instruction which implied that the
difference in the amount of the taxpayer's assets between the opening and
closing dates was net income. On appeal, held, conviction reversed, the charge
was inadequate. The 1954 decisions of the Supreme Court prescribing a
20. Id. at 601, 83 P.2d at 99. Accord: In re Lombard's Estate, 16 Cal. App. 2d 526, CO
P.2d 1000 (1936) ; In re Kurtz's Estate, 190 Cal. 146, 210 Pac. 959 (1922); In re Lindsay's
Estate, 176 Cal. 238, 16S Pac. 113 (1917).
21. 69 Nev. 204, 245 P.2d 990 (1952).
22. West's Ann. Prob. Code § 90 (Cal. 1931). § 90 provides: 'Vhen a testator omits
to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child, whether

born before or after the making of the will or before or after the death of the testator, and
such child or issue are unprovided for by any settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the testator's property bestowed on them by way of advancement, unless it appears from the will that such omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds to
the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate."
23. See note 21 supra.
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standard for the instructions to be given to the jury in all net worth prosecutions
are applicable to all such cases pending review irrespective of their relative
dates of trial. United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956).
The term net worth refers to the inferential process utilized by the Government, in both civil and criminal proceedings, to establish taxable income. If
the taxpayer's increased net worth for the period examined plus non-deductible
expenditures minus his non-taxable receipts exceeds his reported income, then
unreported income is indicated.' In a civil action to recover the deficiency the
Commissioner's determination is given prima facie validity 2 If, however, the
action is a criminal prosecution for willful evasion under section 145 (b) of the
Code3 the burden of proof as to all the elements of the crime rests upon the
Government. 4
At present in over 50 per cent of the prosecutions for the willful evasion of
income tax the Government utilizes the net worth method.5 However, in the
early days of criminal actions of this nature the increased net worth or
unexplained expenditures of the taxpayer had been used merely to corroborate
some direct proof of specific unreported income. 6 The use of the net worth
method of proof became more frequent with the prosecutions of persons whose
sources of income were apparently illegal.T The first such conviction to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court was that of "Big Bill" Johnson in 1943.8 The
defendant, a notorious gambler, had a record of expenditures considdrably in
excess of his reported income. The Supreme Court held that the jury was
justified in finding that the defendant's expenditures were attributable to his
unreported income from his gambling enterprises; it further held that it was
unnecessary for the Government to prove the exact amount of such income.
"To require more

. . .

proof than

.

.

that there were unreported profits

from an elaborately concealed illegal business would be tantamount to holding
that skillful concealment is an invincible barrier to proof."9
Utilization of the net worth method of prosecution had in effect been sanctioned but how it was to be utilized caused conflict and consternation within the
circuit courts for the next eleven years. 10 Three different theories arose as to the
burden of proof." Two circuits held that the Government must establish the
1. Avakian, Net Worth Computations as Proof of Tax Evasion, 10 Tax L. Rev. 431

(1955).
2. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1945); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507
(1934).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 145 (b).
4. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
S. Avakian, op. cit. supra note 1, at 434 n. 10.
6. Guzik V. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 545 (1931);
Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 669 (1931).
7. See Mills, The Net Worth Approach in Determining Income, 41 Va. L. Rev. 927 (1955).
8. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
9.

Id. at 517-18.

10. See Krasilovsky and Stein, An Evaluation of Net Worth Prosecutions of Income Tax
Evaders, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 49 (1954).
11. United States v. Caserta, 199 F.2d 905 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Jelaza v. United States, 179
F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949).

1956-571

CASE NOTES

taxpayer's opening net worth with certainty"- whereas the majority held that
reasonable certainty was all that would be required. Some courts were of the
opinion that section 41 of the Code13 confined utilization of the method to
situations where the taxpayer had no books or where his books were inadequate. 14 As late as 1954 one circuit court expressed the opinion that use of the
net worth method should only be permitted where the unreported income had
a suspicious origin.:
After consistently denying certiorari to net worth cases, the Supreme Court,
apparently conscious of the mounting apprehension of both practitioners and
prosecutors concerning the validity of the method, decided four important cases
in the fall of 1954.10 Among the four was the case of Holland v. United States'7
in which the Government relied on evidence which tended to show that the
petitioners received profits from the operation of a hotel, far in excess of their
reported income; that during the period under examination the petitioners' net
worth had increased in excess of their reported income; and that the only
plausible explanation for this increased net worth was unreported taxable income. Although the Court unanimously affirmed petitioners' convictions and
sanctioned the utilization of the net worth method it cautioned the lower courts
to "closely scrutinize its use."' 8 The necessity for such an admonition is clear
in view of the latitude allowed the prosecution. The Court held that the opening net worth, an indispensable element, need only be established with reasonable
certainty.' 9 Similarly, willfulness may be inferred from "conduct the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal." : '3 It is unnecessary that the
Government preclude with absolute certainty all possibility of a non-taxable
source as the origin of the increased evaluation. 2' And although the burden of
proof never shifts to the taxpayer, once the Government has sustained a basis
for an inference of guilt the taxpayer "remains quiet at his peril."2
Aware that a jury might easily become hopelessly confused when confronted
with the evidential complexities inherent in such a method of prosecution, the
Supreme Court requires an "adequate instruction" of the jury in the net worth
method. "Charges should be especially clear, including, in addition to the
formal instructions, a summary of the nature of the net worth method, the
12. Bryan v. United States, 175 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 338 US. 552 (1950);
United States v. Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949).
13. Tnt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 41.
14. United States v. Williams, 203 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v, Riganto, 121
F. Supp. 158 (ED. Va. 1954).
15. United States v. Clark, 123 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
16. Holland v. United States, 34S U.S. 121 (1954); Fricdberg v. United States, 343 US.
142 (1954); Smith v. United States, 343 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 343

US. 160 (1954).
17. 343 U.S. 121 (1954).
18. Id. at 125.
19. Id. at 132.

20. Id. at 125, citing Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,499 (1943).
21. Id. at 137-38.
22. Id. at 139.
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assumptions on which it rests and the inferences available both for and against
the accused. '" 3
In June of 1955, on an appeal from a conviction which pre-dated the Holland
decision, the seventh circuit in United States v. Bardin,24 having awaited the
determination of the former, held that the application of the standard for jury
instruction prescribed therein was intentionally limited by the Supreme Court
to prospective net worth prosecutions. The court reached this conclusion after
finding that although the instructions actually given in the Holland trial and
to which the defendants specifically objected fell short of the Supreme Court
standard, the convictions were unanimously affirmed.
In the instant case the second circuit unanimously rejected the Bardin
theory 25 and held that the latest rules of the Supreme Court are determinative
in all cases on appeal irrespective of their relative dates of trial. To sustain its
holding the court in the instant case noted that at the time the Supreme Court
announced its decision in the Holland case, it also granted certiorari to nine
other net worth cases, vacated the judgments therein, and remanded them for
reconsideration in the light of the Holland decision. 20 Although none of the
other circuit courts have specifically considered this question
the instant case
27
is in accord with the weight of authority in analogous cases.
The present case raises an interesting question as to the propriety of the
utilization of combined net worth statements in criminal prosecutions. The Government's net worth statement joined the assets of the defendant with assets
of his wife and children, assets of a co-partnership of which he was a member,
and at least one asset of a corporation not owned by the defendant. At no time
in the trial did the Government segregate the assets of the defendant so as to
reflect his individual net worth. For this reason the defendant charged that
the Government's computations constituted serious error. On this point a
critical distinction must be made between civil and criminal actions. In the
former the determination of the Commissioner is given prima facie validity and
if the Commissioner in his calculations consolidates the assets of a whole family
the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the determination is erroneous.2 8
In a criminal action, however, the burden of proof is on the Government as
to every element of the offense; a mere statement by the Government of individual or combined net worth is, of itself, of no evidential value. In order
23. Id. at 129. (Emphasis added.) For an instance where a juror completely misunderstood the implications of the net worth method see United States v. Benham, 215 F.2d 472
(5th Cir. 1954).
24. 224 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955).
25. In the opinion of the instant case it is interesting to note that the adequate instruction
on the net worth method, mandatory in all such prosecutions, may be given either In the
charge to the jury or during the trial itself.
26. For a list of the cases remanded see Avakian, op. cit. supra note 1, at 432 n.5.
27. See Warring v. United States, 222 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861
(1955) ; Watts v. United States, 220 F.2d 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 939 (1955) ;
United States v. Adonis, 221 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Vloutis v. United States, 219 F.2d 782
(5th Cir. 1955).
28. See William G. Lias, 24 T.C. 280 (1955).
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to have the items of the net worth statement accepted the Government must
prove that they are assets of the defendant or that they evidence a taxable
expenditure made by the defendant.
Since the enumerated items of a combined net worth statement are relevant
to the prosecution of a single defendant only when it has been established that
they in some way effect an increase in his individual net worth and since such
a combined statement often tends to confuse and mislead a jury, the propriety
of introducing a combined net worth statement in a criminal prosecution is
questionable. Without specifically so indicating, the court, in the instant case,
through its general adverse criticism of the Government, by criticizing the
nature of its combined net worth statement and its subsequent failure to segregate the assets enumerated therein, implied that the practice of consolidating
assets in a net worth statement will hereafter be treated with suspicion in a
criminal case.
Torts - Suits Against Public Corporations - Constitutionality of Statute
Conferring Authority on the Court of Claims to Hear Suits Against the
New York Thruway Authority.-Plaintiff commenced an action in the New
York State Supreme Court, Albany County, to recover damages for negligence
against the New York State Thruway Authority. Special term granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint since section 361-b of the New York
Public Authorities Law conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims
to hear and determine claims against the Thruway Authority, rejecting plaintiff's contention that the section was unconstitutional. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, held, one judge dissenting, affirmed. Article VI, section 23 of the
state constitution was not intended to and did not deprive the legislature of the
power to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear and determine suits
against the Thruway Authority, and hence the statute is constitutional.
Easley v. New York State Thruway Authority, 1 N.Y.2d 374, 135 N.E.2d 572
(1956).
At common law the king could do no wrong' and the state, therefore, when
performing its governmental functions was immune to suits for its torts and
the torts of its officers and agents.2 Public3 and municipal 4 corporations, since
they perform state governmental work, the former on a functional basisP and
1. See Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 683, 135 So. 175 (1938).
2. Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 4S4, 104 N.E.2d S66 (1952); In re Hoople's
Estate, 179 N.Y. 303, 72 N.E. 229 (1904); Hughes v. State, 252 App. Div. 263, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 387 (3d Dep't 1937); Condon v. State, 169 Misec. 666, S N.Y.S.2d 544 (Ct. CL 1938).
3. Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority, 255 App. Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't
193S). See also Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, 285 N.Y. 425, 35 N.E.2d 25 (1941); Buck v.
State, 19S Misc. 575, 96 N.Y.S.2d 667 (CL Cl. 1950).
4. Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 4S4, 104 N.E.2d 366 (1952); Wilcox v. Rochezter,
190 N.Y. 137, S2 N.E. 1119 (1907); Maxmilian v. Mayor, 62 N.Y. 160 (1875); McCarthy

v. Saratoga Springs, 269 App. Div. 469, 56 N.Y. Supp. 600 (3d Dep't 1945). But see Herman
v. Board of Education, 234 N.Y. 196, 137 N.E. 24 (1922).
5. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 517 (1319); Economic Power
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the latter in a geographic area, derivatively shared in the state's immunity. 0
However, the state may waive its immunity, either absolutely or conditionally. 7
This was done in New York by section 12 (a) of the Court of Claims Act, upon
however, that all claims against the state be brought in the Court of
condition,
8
Claims.
The immunity of municipal and public corporations, it has been held, was
also impliedly waived by section 12(a). 9 But the legislature did not see fit to
condition the right to sue municipalities on the bringing of that suit in any
special court. 10 This is based on the reasoning that, though municipal corporations perform a governmental function for the state, a suit against the municipal
corporation is not a suit against the state. The state is not acting through
municipalities, but rather it has delegated some of its power to them so that they
may perform some of its duties. In the case of Pantess v. Saratoga Springs
Authority, the Appellate Division applied this doctrine to public corporations,
holding that a suit against a public corporation such as the Saratoga Springs
Authority was not a suit against the state." The appellation "public corporation" seems to be not alone controlling, but the criterion is whether the state
has chosen to act directly in the carrying out of its governmental function
". .. even though it create and use a corporation for that purpose . . ." or
whether the state has delegated some of its power for the performance of a
governmental function, while ". . . the agency exercises its independent
authority as delegated, as does a city. .... ,,12 In the former instance the state
is responsible for the conduct of its agent, whom it is employing for a certain
purpose.'3 In the latter, the corporation, since it is acting independently, must
be liable for its own actions apart from any liability on the part of the state.
For that reason, the court in the Pantess case, held that such suits must be
brought into the Supreme Court, since the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
covered only suits directly against the state.
Though in drafting section 12(a), the state had not chosen to place any
& Constr. Co. v. Buffalo, 195 N.Y. 286, 88 N.E. 389 (1909); Van Campen v. Olean Gen.
Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554 (4th Dep't 1924). See 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of Corporations §§ 57-62 (rev. ed. 1931).
6. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
7. Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952).
8. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 467, § 12(a), now, N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8 (N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1939, c. 860).
9. Bloom v. Jewish Board of Guardians, 286 N.Y. 349, 36 N.E.2d 617 (1941).
10. Such suits were generally brought in the Supreme Court, the court of general Jurisdiction. See Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority, 255 App. Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't
1938); Buck v. State, 198 Misc. 575, 96 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
11. Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority, 255 App. Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't
1938).
12. Id. at 428, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 105. See also Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436, 131
N.E.2d 721 (1956) ; Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, 285 N.Y. 425, 35 N.E.2d 25 (1941) ; Paige
v. State, 269 N. Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936); Sadigur v. State, 173 Misc. 645, 18 N.Y.S.2d
356 (Ct. CI. 1940).
13. Pa:ge v. State, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936).
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condition on the right to sue corporations to which it had delegated some of its
governmental powers, it nevertheless retained the right to do so.14 That right
was first exercised in 1939, after the Pantess case had been decided, when the
legislature passed section 1306-a of the Public Authorities Law, vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to hear claims against the Saratoga Springs
Authority. It was again exercised in 1954 when section 361-a was passed,
giving the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Thruway
Authority. The constitutionality of this section was attacked in the instant
case.
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Court of Appeals properly
rejected appellant's contention that section 361-b violated article VI section 115
of the state constitution by depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction previously vested in it.'0 The jurisdiction which the legislature took from the
Supreme Court by 361-b, the majority held, was legislative in origin, not a
part of the court's constitutional jurisdiction.17 Thus, what was vested in the
court by the legislature could be revoked by that same power.
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant's further contention that section
361-b violates article VI section 23 of the constitution. By this section, added
to the constitution in 1948, the Court of Claims was continued and made a
court of record, with its original jurisdiction ". . . to hear and determine claims
against the state or by the state against the claimant or between conflicting
claimants as the legislature may provide," left unchanged. 18 No provision was
made for suits against public corporations, though the amendment was passed
after the passage of section 1306-a. It was appellant's contention that the
legislature after considering the possibility of including suits against public
corporations within the court's jurisdiction, decided against it. In rejecting
this argument, the majority pointed to the fact that the same legislature which
originally proposed the constitutional amendment had passed section 1306-a.
14. See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 4S4, 104 N.EX2d 866 (1952).
15. This section reads: "The supreme court is continued v.with general jurisdiction in law
and equity.... "

16. See Decker v. Canzoneri, 256 App. Div. 63, 9 N.Y.S.2d 210 (3d Dep't 1939).
17. See Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N.Y. 47,133 N.E. 123 (1921).
18. In regard to the provision granting jurisdiction to hear claims "between conflicting
claimants as the legislature may provide," the following colloquy took place at the 1938 Constitutional Convention when this amendment was first introduced:
"Mr. G. C. Lewis: On line 21, where the way is opened for additional jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims, that expression between conflicting claimants is intended to mean where

there are conflicting claimants in one of these cases that come ordinarily before the Court of
Claims.
Mrx. Sears: Certainly.
Mr. G. C. Lewis: It would not mean just between conflicting clmants in any ordinary civil
action.
Mr. Sears: Oh, no. This relates to claimants before the Court of Claims, and the purpose of
the provision is to allow complete and final determination of all the controversies giving out
of the particular matter which is the subject to the claim or claims." Revised record of the
Constitutional Convention of 1938, pp. 2001-02.
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Further, even after the amendment had been passed the legislature passed
section 361-b in 1954 and in 1955 it put through section 163-a giving the Court

of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Jones Beach State Parkway Authority. The court places great emphasis on these facts stating, "statutes

are presumed to be constitutional, Legislatures are presumed to know what
statutes are on the books and what is intended by constitutional amendments

approved by the Legislature itself."'

9

The principal reason in support of the majority position is that the legislature, in proposing section 23, article VI, was not concerned with the question

of the court's jurisdiction. For years the Court of Claims had been a "political
football." 20 Since it had been created by legislative enactment, it could be
abolished by that same power. Therefore, as control over the legislature

switched from one political party to another, the Court of Claims was abolished
and replaced by a board of claims, which in turn was abolished and the Court
of Claims recreated. The purpose of each change was to permit the party in
power to replace the justices then on the court.2 ' To obviate such maneuverings

in the future and to put justices of the Court of Claims on the same footing with
justices of the Supreme Court, the legislature determined to amend the constitution making the Court of Claims a constitutional court. An "abstract,"
submitted to the voters when the amendment was passed in 1949, stated: "The

purpose and effect of this proposed amendment is to make the Court of Claims
a constitutional court and thereby
deprive the legislature of its present power
'22
to abolish that court at any time."
This amendment did little more than insert the old Court of Claims Act into
the constitution. While the old act was in effect, section 1306-a of the Public
Authorities Law had been passed vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of
Claims to hear suits against a public corporation. It is reasonable, then, to
assume that the legislature believed that the new amendment, having the same
jurisdictional provision as the old act, was similarly flexible. This in all likelihood was their intent since they thereafter passed two other statutes vesting
19. 1 N.Y.2d at 379, 135 N.E.2d at 575. The majority further stressed the closeness of the
Authority's relationship to the state, citing Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436, 131 N.E.2d
721 (1956). In Glassman, however, though the state agency was endowed with the powers
and privileges of a corporation, the court held that its relationship to the state was so close
that suit against the agency was suit against the state. See Sunlit Gardens v. Moore, 183
Misc. 343, 48 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Such is not the situation with the Thruway
Authority. In Strang v. New York, 206 Misc. 734, 134 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Ct. Cl. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 285 App. Div. 1117, 143 N.Y.S.2d 615 (4th Dep't 1955), it was held that the
Thruway Authority is within the rule of Pantess. Indeed, if it were not within that rule
section 361-b would be unnecessary since suits against it would then be automatically within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, 285 N.Y. 425, 35 N.E.2d
25 (1941).
20. Revised record of the Constitutional Convention of 1938, p. 2001.
21. See People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 97 N.E. 850 (1912).
22. An abstract similar in import had been submitted to the voters when the amendment
was first proposed and rejected in 1938. See the document issued by the New York Secretary
of State, Sept. 8, 1938, p. 95.
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exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to hear suits against public
corporations.
Workmen's Compensation -

Waiver of Immunity by Employer in an

Action at Law.Plaintiff's intestate died as a result of injuries suffered in
a collision between a city owned truck, in which he was riding, and an automobile. Suit was instituted against the driver of the automobile who joined the
driver of the city's truck and the city as additional defendants. The trial
of the negligence issue and liability therefor resulted in a jury's verdict against
the defendants jointly in the sum of $40,000. The plaintiff collected $15,000
from the automobile driver's insurance carrier and caused a writ of mandamus
execution to be issued against the city-employer for the balance of the judgment. The city petitioned to quash execution and to have the judgment marked
satisfied claiming that its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
exclusive. The plaintiff argued that by failing to raise the defense of immunity
at the trial, defendant had waived its rights thereunder. The Court of Common
Pleas entered an order for the employer. Upon appeal, two justices dissenting,
held, affirmed. An employer, joined as a third party defendant in an action
brought by his employee, does not waive his immunity under workmen's compensation by failing to assert such immunity prior to an attempt to execute
judgment. Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956).
It is generally held that when an employer complies with the requirements of
his state's workmen's compensation law his liability to an employee for injuries
suffered in the course of employment is strictly defined by the terms of that act
and it is the exclusive remedy available to an employee.' However, in an action
at law instituted by the employee against his employer, the employer must
affirmatively plead the protection offered him by the act2 and the burden of
proving that he is within the act is upon him. 3 The compensation acts, generally,
do not prohibit an employer from waiving any rights that he may have under
them.4
A failure to raise a defense will generally preclude its use in any further
proceeding in the same action.2 Thus a defendant in a proceeding to enforce
the collection of a judgment is estopped to plead matters which might properly
have been urged as a defense prior to the judgment. However, this rule does
1. 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 76:21 (1952).
2. Behringer v. Inspiration ConsoL Copper Co., 17 Ariz. 232, 149 Pac. 1055 (1915);
Gorrell v. Battelle, 93 Kan. 370, 144 Pac. 244 (1914); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co, 131
Md. 265, 101 At. 710 (1917); Kemper v. Gluck, 327 Mo. 733, 39 S.W.2d 330 (1931);
Warren v. American Car & Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 755, 33 S.W.2d 718 (1931); Murphy v.
Elmwood Country Club, Inc., S0 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Hammet v. Vogue Inc., 179
Tenn. 2S4, 165 S.W.2d 577 (1942).
3. 71 CJ., Workmen's Compensation § 1501 (1935).
4. Henson Robinson Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 3S6 Ii. 232, 53 N.E,2d 31 (1944).
5. 34 C. J., Judgments § 1267 (1924).
6. Rolls County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733 (1831); Allen v. Parker, 175 N.C.
190, 95 S.E. 170 (1918); Continental Title Co. v. Devlin, 2G9 Pa. 380, 53 AU. 343 (1904);
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not apply where the defendant is precluded from interposing his defense by
7
reason of law or ruling of the court.
In the case of McIntyre v. Strausser,8 the plaintiff was a passenger in his
employer's automobile when it collided with defendant's automobile. The
defendant joined the plaintiff's employer as a joint tort-feasor, as permitted by
Pennsylvania law, 9 in the plenary suit for negligence. The employer interposed
the affirmative defense of workmen's compensation but was not permitted to
introduce any proof at the trial of the existence of the employer-employee relationship. A verdict was returned in favor of the original defendant but against
the employer who thereupon moved for judgment n.o.v. The motion was denied,
expressly reserving to the employer the right to move to have the judgment
marked satisfied of record. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of
the lower court stating: "Since it is clear that the employer-defendant at the
trial was properly precluded from establishing the facts concerning the employeremployee relationship, we agree with the learned court below that the proper
procedure is for the employer-defendant to rule the plaintiff to show cause why
the judgment should not be satisfied of record."' 1
In the earlier case of Maio v. Faks," where the employer, also joined as a
third party defendant, moved for judgment n.o.v., it was held that to grant the
employer's motion would nullify the original defendant's right to contribution
from his joint tort-feasor. 12 In that case the employer had entered into a stipulation with the plaintiff specifically limiting the employer's liability to that provided by the compensation act.' 3
The court in the instant case held that the employer did not waive his limited
liability under workmen's compensation because he had neither the duty nor
the right to interpose such protection prior to plaintiff's attempt to execute the
judgment.' 4 The court interpreted the Strausser and Fahs cases as establishing
the rule that 1) the employer may not introduce evidence establishing the
employer-employee relationship at the trial,' 5 and 2) a motion for judgment
n.o.v. may not be granted the employer since the granting of such motion would
vitiate the original defendant's right to contribution.' 0
Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S.W. 1120 (1897); Smith v. Ormsby, 20 Wash. 396,
55 Pac. 570 (1898).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. 365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1950).

9. Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2083 (1951);
Shaull v. A. S. Beck N.Y. Shoe Co., 369 Pa. 112, 85 A.2d 698 (1952).
10. McIntyre v. Strausser, 365 Pa. 507, 509, 76 A.2d 220, 221 (1950).
11. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
12. "The entry of judgment n.o.v. in favor of [the employer] . . .would destroy Fah's
right of contribution against that corporation in spite of the fact that the jury found that
all three defendants were jointly and severally liable for Sell's death." 339 Pa. at 188-89,
14 A.2d at 109.
13. Id. at 190, 14 A.2d at 110.
14. 385 Pa. at 642, 123 A.2d at 842.

15. "Such proof would be likely to work to the advantage of the non-employer defendant by way of a reduced verdict." 385 Pa. at 640, 123 A.2d at 841.
16. Id. at 642, 123 A.2d at 842.
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It is to this interpretation that the dissenting opinions so vigorously object. 17
They distinguish the earlier cases by pointing out that in each there was some
affirmative step taken by the employer to preserve his right under the compensation law. In each case the employer pleaded workmen's compensation as an
affirmative defense and after verdict was rendered moved for judgment n.o.v.
which was denied. In Maio v. Fahs,18 the court took cognizance of the stipulation between plaintiff and employer limiting the latter's liability to that provided for by the compensation act.") In the present case the employer took no
affirmative steps to protect itself; on the contrary, it offered to settle for an
amount greater than it would be required to pay under the compensation actY°
The dissenters argue that the employer here by failing to invoke the protection
of the compensation act as soon as it was joined, waived its rights.2 1
The majority interprets the two earlier cases as laying down clear rules of
law, the effect of which is to deny to an employer, joined as a defendant, the
right to interpose the protection afforded him by the workmen's compensation
statute, at anytime prior to an attempt to execute judgment against him. If
that is true it follows necessarily that the defendant-employer cannot be held
to have waived such protectionP- A right to contribution among joint tortfeasors exists under Pennsylvania law.P The pre-ent case appears to have
harmonized the conflict of rights arising between the original defendant seeking
contribution and a joint tort-feasor employer protected by the compensation
law. Jurisdictions which do not permit an employer to be joined in an action
at law by his employee, even for the purpose of protecting an original defendant's
right of contribution are not, of course, faced with this problem.24
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

3S5 Pa. at 644, 123 A.2d at 843 (disent); 385 Pa. at 647, 123 A2d at 844 (dissent).
339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
Id. at 190, 14 A.2d at 110.
3S5 Pa. at 648, 123 A.2d at 844.
Id. at 650, 123 A.2d at 846.
See note 3 supra.

23. Uniform
"Whatever may
own State that
though . .. for

Contribution Among Tort-feasers Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 2033 (1951).
be the law in the majority of other jurisdictions, ... it is established in our
a tort-feasor has a right to contribution against a joint tort-fearor even
some reason, the plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against both of them

is precluded from enforcing liability thereunder against the joint tort-feaor." Puller v.

Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 221, 110 A.2d 175, 177 (1955).
24. See note 1 supra.

